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Conventions in Comparative Constitutional Law 
 
Horst Dippel, University of Kassel 
 
“Convention” is an ambiguous term, not only for lawyers, containing a wide 
variety of different meanings. Even when restricted to denote an assembly it 
may be used for all sorts of gatherings. In the context of constitutional law a 
convention is a very specific instrument, and the question is to what extent it is 
actually known in European constitutional law and whether the “Convention on 
the Future of Europe” as called forth by the Declaration of Laeken  conforms to 
what is understood in constitutional law by “convention”.
1 Or did the Laeken 
Council pick up a term without any foundation in European constitutional law, 
rarely practiced and even less understood, the only precedents of which are 
supposed to be the American Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and 
the convention that drafted the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, as 
can be read time and again?
2   
As it is the privilege of the constitutional historian to make aware the evolution 
of legal institutions and to analyze their conferred meaning so that they will be 
available in political discourse, I shall examine the meaning of “convention” in 
constitutional history and comparative constitutional law in a first part, while a 
second part will place the Convention on the Future of the European Union 
according to its composition and commission into the context of constitutional 
conventions as understood in law.  
                                                 
1   Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union,  http://european-
convention.eu.int/enjeux.asp?lang=EN (15 January 2003). 
2   Cf.  “The Convention on the Future of Europe begins its work [Editorial]”, in: European 
Law Review, 27 (2002), 119; Beate Neuss, “Die Krise als Durchbruch.  Die EU zwischen 
Vertragsreform und Verfassungsentwurf”, in: Internationale Politik, 57 (2002), 9-10; Waldemar 
Hummer, “Vom Grundrechte-Konvent zum Zukunfts-Konvent. Semantische und andere 
Ungereimtheiten bei der Beschickung des ‘Konvents zur Zukunft Europas’”, in: Zeitschrift für 
Parlamentsfragen, 33 (2002), esp. 325-328; Norbert K. Riedel, “Der Konvent zur Zukunft 
Europas. Die Erklärung von Laeken zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union”, in:  Zeitschrift für 
Rechtspolitik, 35 (2002), esp. 242; also “The EU’s constitutional convention: The founding 
fathers, maybe”, in: The Economist, 23 February 2002, 33; Youri Devuyst, The European Union 
at the Crossroads. The EU’s Institutional Evolution from the Schuman Plan to the European 
Convention, 2
nd ed., Brussels etc.: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2003, 34-35.   3   
1.  Conventions in Constitutional History and Law 
Historically, conventions made their first appearance in constitutional law in the 
context of the English constitution. Until today the constitution of the United 
Kingdom comprises some long-established conventions as non-legal rules of 
the constitution,
3 conventions as they are also known in some other countries 
as part of the constitution.
4 More pertinent to the case at hand is, however, that 
“extraordinary assembly of parliament” in seventeenth-century England, which 
the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d’Alembert already mentioned in analyzing the 
different meanings of “convention”.
5 The legal standing of this particular 
assembly was provided, several years after the  Encyclopédie, by William 
Blackstone. In the course of its history England had twice experienced so-called 
Convention Parliaments, in 1660 and in 1688/89. They had been normal 
parliaments in all but in name, for in the absence of a monarch they  had 
assembled without royal summons. Blackstone’s legal reasoning was 
compelling: “[I]n such a case as the palpable vacancy of a throne, it follows ex 
necessitate rei, that the form of the royal writs must be laid aside, otherwise no 
parliament can ever meet again [...] So that, notwithstanding these two capital 
exceptions, which were justifiable only on the principle of necessity, (and each 
of which, by the way, induced a revolution in the government) the rule laid down 
is in general certain, that the king, only, can convoke a parliament.”
6 
These two parliaments which had introduced substantial constitutional change 
in the country, had not been parliaments in a strictly legal sense, but only 
conventions which styled themselves parliaments or convention parliaments. 
Interestingly enough and in contrast to Blackstone, it was not the political 
reason – the necessity of a parliament in the absence of a monarch – but its 
constitutional aspect – major changes brought about in the constitution of the 
country  – which proved to have a resounding impact almost a hundred years 
later. 
                                                 
3   Cf. Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions. The Rules and Forms of Political 
Accountability, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
4   Cf. Andrew Heard,  Canadian Constitutional Conventions. The Marriage of Law and 
Politics, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
5   Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une 
société de gens de lettres, ed. by Denis Diderot and  Jean-Baptiste d’Alembert, IV, Paris : 
Briasson et al., 1754, 164, cf. the whole article, 161-164. 
6   William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols., Oxford: Clarendon, 
1765-69 (repr. Chicago-London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), I, 148.    4   
More than a decade before the famous Philadelphia Convention of 1787 
assembled, Americans had started to think about the Glorious Revolution in 
England and its convention parliament in 1688-89 and what had gone wrong 
with it during the course of the eighteenth century so that what had helped to 
secure English liberty could have become tyrannical from an American 
perspective, almost a hundred years later. Out of the numerous reflections on 
conventions, legislatures, and constitutions, the ideas pinned down by the town 
meeting of Concord, Massachusetts, on October 22, 1776, are particularly 
illuminating, as it resolved: “That the Supreme Legislative, either in their Proper 
Capacity, or in Joint Committee, are by no means a Body proper to form and 
Establish a Constitution; for Reasons following. first Because we Conceive that 
a Constitution in its Proper Idea intends a System of Principles Established to 
Secure the Subject in the Possession and e njoyment of their Rights and 
Priviliges, against any Encroachments of the Governing Part—2d Because the 
Same Body that forms a Constitution have of Consequence a power to alter it. 
3d—Because a Constitution alterable by the Supreme Legislative is no Security 
at all to the Subject against any Encroachment of the Governing part on any, or 
on all their Rights and priviliges. Resolve 3d. That it appears to this Town highly 
necesary and Expedient that a Convention, or Congress be immediately 
Chosen, to form and  establish a Constitution, by the Inhabitents of the 
Respective Towns in this State [...] Resolve 4
th. that when the Convention, or 
Congress have formed a Constitution they adjourn for a Short time, and Publish 
their Proposed Constitution for the Inspection and Remarks of the Inhabitents of 
this State.”
7 
The Concord Resolution is not only of major importance for its early definitions 
both of a modern constitution and of a convention, but also as a critique both of 
1688-89 and of some conventions that had already taken place in several 
American states in 1776 as in Pennsylvania where, just a few weeks earlier, a 
convention had adopted the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776. More closely to 
the English example, in Pennsylvania it had been an elected convention which 
had drafted the constitution and, without submitting it to the people, in its own 
right had adopted it, while at the same time performing legislative functions. 
                                                 
7   The Popular Sources of Political Authority. Documents on the M assachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, ed. by Oscar and Mary Handlin, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1966, 
152-153.   5   
John Alexander Jameson in his classic The Constitutional Convention called 
this kind of convention a revolutionary convention,
8 which in his view was in 
terms of law completely different from the most mature form of conventions, the 
constitutional convention, which also was the form the people of Concord 
seemed to have had in mind. The definition Judge Jameson gave of a 
constitutional convention a hundred and thirty years ago is sound theory still 
today. According to him, the constitutional convention differs from the 
revolutionary convention “not simply as having for its object the framing or 
amending of Constitutions, but as being within, rather than without, the pale of 
the fundamental law; as ancillary and subservient and not hostile and 
paramount to it. This species of Convention sustains an official relation to the 
state, considered as a political organization. It is charged with a definite, and not 
a discretionary and indeterminate, function. It always acts under a commission, 
for a purpose ascertained and limited by law or by custom. Its principal feature, 
as contradistinguished from the Revolutionary Convention, is, that at every step 
and moment of its existence, it is subaltern, – it is by the side and at the call of a 
government preëxisting and intended to survive it, for the purpose of 
administering to its special needs. It never supplants the existing organization. It 
never governs. Though called to look into and recommend improvements in the 
fundamental laws, it enacts neither them nor the statute law; and it performs no 
act of administration.”
9 
What Jameson described was how to make liberty, democracy, and the rule of 
law prevail in the inevitable process of changing the constitution. Instead of 
political upheaval the orderly process of a constitutional convention was to give 
direction to necessary changes, and there is virtually no American state which 
does not subscribe to this instrument for altering and amending its constitution, 
though increasingly as merely one possibility among several. Throughout 
history, including the most recent past, however, other options for the amending 
process have mostly been used, and on a national scale the convention 
method, though expressly stated in article V of the U.S. Constitution, was never 
taken up again after 1787. One of the reasons for the reluctance to make use of 
it seems to be the  – exaggerated, as several authors argue  – fear that a 
                                                 
8   John Alexander Jameson,  The Constitutional Convention; Its History, Powers, and 
Modes of Proceeding, 3
rd ed., Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1873, 6-9, 129-130. 
9   Jameson, The Constitutional Convention, 10.   6   
constitutional convention may get out of control and "run away",
10 and the 
Philadelphia convention of 1787, the pretended example for the Convention on 
the Future of the European Union, has often been described as a runaway 
convention.
11  
After all, the Annapolis Convention of 1786 had suggested to call for a new 
convention in Philadelphia in 1787 “to take into Consideration the situation of 
the United States, to devise such further Provisions as shall appear to them 
necessary to render the Constitution of the Foederal Government adequate to 
the exigencies of the Union”.
12 Congress adopted the suggestion and resolved 
that delegates be sent to Philadelphia “for the sole and express purpose of 
revising the Articles of Confederation”.
13 No doubt, the Philadelphia Convention 
had no mandate to draft a new constitution. Moreover, it also created its own 
rules for adopting its draft. Article VII of the proposed constitution decreed: “The 
Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution.” This was written in open contradiction to 
existing constitutional law which ruled out any alteration of the Articles of 
Confederation unless it be “agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and 
be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State”.
14 
Politically successful as the Philadelphia Convention was, in strict terms of 
existing constitutional law it was unconstitutional, a questionable model for the 
Convention on the Future of the European Union. The aura, or more 
appropriately, the mystification of the Philadelphia Convention, however, gave 
momentum to the term. But with regard to theory the example set by 
Massachusetts in 1779-80, after the failure of a previous attempt to establish a 
                                                 
10   Cf. Russell L. Caplan,  Constitutional Brinkmanship. Amending the Constitution by 
National Convention, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
11   Cf. David G. Smith, The Convention and the Constitution. The Political Ideas of the 
Founding Fathers, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987, 21-26. Cf. also Joseph J. 
Ellis, Founding Brothers. The Revolutionary Generation, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, 8. 
12   Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States, 1786-1870. Derived from 
the Records, Manuscripts, and Rolls Deposited in the Bureau of Rolls and Library of the 
Department of State, 3 vols., Washington: Department of State, 1894-1900, I, 5. 
13   Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States, I, 8. Cf. 1787: Drafting the 
U.S. Constitution, ed. by Wilbourn E. Benton, I, College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 
1986, 47-83;  Creating the Constitution, ed. by. John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler, Acton, 
MA: Copley, 1999, 49-50, 61-63. 
14   Articles of Confederation, art. XIII, in: The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial 
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore 
Forming the United States, ed. by Francis Newton Thorpe, 7 vols., Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1909, I, 15.   7   
constitution, became more important. Approaching the design Jameson later 
described, the legislature called for the election of a convention to draft a 
constitution to be submitted to the people for consideration. It was this classic 
example, not the Philadelphia Convention, that in decades to come and with 
some subsequent sophistication found its way into American state constitutions. 
But even today, with the almost exclusive fixation on the national constitution 
and its history and the disregard of state constitutional development, the idea of 
a constitutional convention still seems to require explanation as to its “myths 
and realities” and its function as “a democratic remedy for problems in a 
democratic society”.
15 
What was debated in the United States and overshadowed by a domineering 
though unique event hardly offered itself as paradigm in Europe. It has been 
argued that the French Revolution in 1792 took up the name “Convention” in 
referring to American models.
16 With the existing English, Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, and Philadelphia type of convention available to the French 
revolutionaries in 1792 as a model, their choice appears to be nothing but self-
evident. Already in August 1791, an intense debate had taken place about how 
to alter and amend the constitution written during the preceding months and 
whether a convention was the appropriate means for this purpose. The 
proponents of a sovereign convention of the English or Pennsylvania type were 
met by those of a subaltern convention of the Massachusetts or Philadelphia 
type. Both failed to win their argument, because a majority believed that the 
constitution should be fixed and stable in order to clearly signify the termination 
of the revolution without, however, realizing that a constitution can only last, if  
the “democratic remedy” of a workable process for amending and revising it is 
provided.
17 
When the inevitable failure of the Constitution of 1791 came, the revolutionary 
convention of 1792 was the obvious result. In every sense it was the opposite of 
Jameson’s constitutional convention: It was paramount and unlimited, it 
                                                 
15   Paul J. Weber and Barbara A. Perry,  Unfounded Fears: Myths and Realities of a 
Constitutional Convention, New York-Westport, CT-London: Greenwood Press, 1989, 106. 
16   Cf. the introductory remarks by Jacques Godechot in his edition of Les Constitutions de 
la France depuis 1789, Paris: Flammarion, 1979, 69. 
17   Cf. Horst Dippel, “La Constitution entre permanence et insurrection: L’idée d’une 
Convention nationale dans les débats  d’août 1791”, in :  La Constitution dans la pensée 
politique. Actes du XIV
e colloque de l’A.F.H.I.P. (Bastia, 7 -8 septembre 2000), ed. by Michel 
Ganzin, Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2001, 205-228.   8   
governed, and it enacted laws, even though its constitution was submitted to the 
people. Even more important and of lasting consequence was its rule by terror, 
thus discrediting this kind of convention in Europe for generations to come. For 
a long time, the first convention in modern European constitutional history 
remained the only one. Wherever political change came abruptly or by 
revolutionary means with a new order resulting in deliberations on a new 
constitution, the preferred model was that of a constituent assembly, which may 
be understood as equivalent to a revolutionary convention, but which was never 
named so. Most of the constitutions they produced addressed the question of 
amendment and revision. But if we look at the European constitutions of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, none of them is known to have provided the 
institution of a constitutional convention for the amending process. 
Nevertheless, conventions now and then made their brief appearance. In March 
1848, the Federal Assembly of the German Confederacy reacted to the 
revolutionary upheavals with a call for a committee of seventeen “men of public 
confidence” (“Männer des allgemeinen Vertrauens”) to revise the Constitution of 
the German Confederacy. According to Jameson’s definition, this committee, 
which handed over its draft by the end of April 1848,
18 may have easily passed 
for a constitutional convention, but, obviously, it was never named so. Not until 
a hundred years later, a constitutional convention made its first official 
appearance in German history with the  Verfassungskonvent von 
Herrenchiemsee. In reality, it was a committee of experts, called together by the 
West German Prime Ministers from August 10 to 23, 1948, to prepare the work 
for the Parlamentarische Rat (Parliamentary Council) which was to meet from 
September 1, 1948 on, to draft the West German constitution (Grundgesetz). 
Regarding their commission it was substantially inferior to that of the Committee 
of Seventeen, and contemporaries had the impression that with regard to the 
meaning of constitutional convention the label Verfassungskonvent was “hardly 
a fitting name”,
19 whereas the Parlamentarische Rat – a curious name by any 
standard for a constitution-making body –  had a much more convincing claim to 
                                                 
18   Cf. Horst Dippel, “Das Paulskirchenparlament 1848/49: Verfassungskonvent oder 
Konstituierende Nationalversammlung?”, in: Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, 
N.F. 48 (2000), esp. 11-15. 
19   Hermann von Mangoldt, “Zum Beruf unserer Zeit für die Verfassungsgebung. 
Grundsätzliches zu den Bonner Verfassungsarbeiten”, in: Die öffentliche Verwaltung, 1 (1948), 
52; cf. Horst Säcker, “Verfassungskonvent 1948”. In:  Die öffentliche Verwaltung, 51 (1998), 
784-792.   9   
the name “convention”.
20 Italy had just made the opposite experience with the 
Costituente (1946-47) that had been modeled less along the classic example of 
the French Constituent Assembly of 1789-91 and adopted at least some of the 
features of a constitutional convention, though without adopting its name.
21 
In concluding this brief historical survey it can be stated that a constitutional 
convention is no established institution in European constitutional law. No 
constitution of the actual fifteen member states of the European Union knows 
this instrument for altering or amending its constitution. In spite of some vague 
intellectual appeal of constitutional conventions in the past, they had practically 
no impact on European constitutional law. What we have, however, here as in 
other parts of the world, are conventions as deliberative, mostly cross-party 
bodies unknown to the existing constitutional law. They may deal with 
constitutional issues, such as the Scottish constitutional conventions of the 
1920s, the 1940s, and, more recently of 1989-91.
22 Another example is 
Australia, which in recent decades experienced two conventions, the last of 
which in 1998.
23 More recently, on March 31, 2003, a first “Convention on 
Federalism” took place in Germany.
24 
In contrast to these constitutional conventions operating outside the established 
constitutional law and normally without direct impact on existing constitutions, 
Argentina owes its present constitution of 1994 to a body around former 
presidents Menem and Alfonsín, which styled itself “Constitutional Convention” 
and decreed: “The prescribed Constitutional text, sanctioned by the 
                                                 
20   I am grateful to Professor Dieter Mahncke for this suggestion. 
21   Cf. recently Carlo Ghisalberti, Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848/1994, 18
th ed., Rome 
and Bari: Laterza, 2002, esp. 405-416; id., “Alle origine della costituzione repubblicana (1943-
1946)”, in: Verfassungsgebung, partitocrazia und Verfassungwandel in Italien vom Ende des II. 
Weltkrieges bis heute, ed. by Hartmut Ullrich, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2001, 41-56; Pietro 
Scoppola, “La costituzione nella storia dell’Italia unita”, in: Dalla costituente alla costituzione. 
Convegno in occasione del cinquantenario della costituzione repubblicana (Roma, 18-20 
dicembre 1997) ( Atti dei convegni Lincei, 146), Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 1998, 
esp. 25-33. 
22   Cf. James Mitchell,  Constitutional Conventions and the Scottish National Movement: 
Origins, Agendas and Outcomes ( Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics, 78), 
Glasgow: Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 1991. 
23   Cf. Heather McRae and Anne Mullins, Australian Constitutional Convention 1973-1985: 
A Guide to the Archives, Melbourne: Centre f or Comparative Constitutional Studies, 1998; 
Steve Vizard,  Two Weeks in Lilliput. Bear-baiting and backbiting at the Constitutional 
Convention, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1998. 
24   Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 April 2003, 7.   10   
Constitutional Convention, replaces the one existing until n ow.”
25  The 
Constitution itself, however, does not know the institution of constitutional 
conventions for revising or amending it. 
Other Latin American countries adopted the institution, though most of them 
under the designation “Asamblea Nacional Constituyente”. But meaning and 
function differ from one country to the next, Nicaragua being the only one where 
the “Asamblea Nacional Constituyente” really is a ruling French-type 
Constituent Assembly, elected for drafting and adopting a new constitution and 
replacing an existing National Assembly.
26 For drafting a new constitution Costa 
Rica also prescribes an “Asamblea Nacional Constituyente”, but this time, as in 
the other Latin American cases, it is more properly a constitutional convention 
acting beside an existing legislature,
27 just as in Guatemala whose constitution 
mandates specific stipulations and articles only to be revised by a convention 
styled “Asamblea Nacional Constituyente”, while others may be changed by the 
legislature, and some are not to be altered at all.
28  
Comparable to most North American state constitutions, Latin American 
constitutions hardly give us any clue as to the legal definition of their 
conventions, whether called Constituent Assembly or Constitutional Convention. 
However, the Constitution of Colombia, which acknowledges three ways of 
changing the constitution, specifies in case an Asamblea Constituyente is 
chosen: “A partir de la elección quedará en suspenso la facultad ordinaria del 
Congreso para reformar la Constitución durante el término señalado para que 
la Asamblea cumpla sus funciones.” And it adds: “La Asamblea adoptará su 
proprio reglamento.”
29 Of all current Latin American constitutions only those of 
Uruguay and of Paraguay properly call this body “Constitutional Convention”, 
with the Paraguayan Constitution being most precise: The number of its 
members shall not exceed those of both houses of Congress, and the 
Convention has also the right to sanction the new constitution. Most interesting 
is article 291, an almost  verbatim quotation from Jameson’s definition:  “La 
                                                 
25   Constitution of Argentina of 1994, Transitional Provisions, art. 17, as in: Constitutions of 
the Countries of the World, ed. by Gisbert H. Flanz, 20 Binders, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana 
Publications, 1971–. 
26   Constitution of Nicaragua of 1995 (tit. X, art. 193). 
27   Constitution of Costa Rica of 1949 (art. 196, as amended by Law 4123, May 31, 1968). 
28   Constitution of Guatemala of 1985 as amended by Legislative Accord No. 18-93 of 1993 
(art. 278-281). Cf. also the constitution of Venezuela of 1999 (tit. VIII, ch. III, art. 343-350). 
29   Constitution of Colombia of 1991 (art. 376, cf. art. 374-379).   11   
Convención Nacional Constituyente es independiente de los poderes 
constituidos. Se limitará, durante el tiempo que duren sus deliberaciones, a sus 
labores de reforma, con exclusión de cualquier otra tarea. No se arrogará las 
atribuciones de los poderes del Estado, no podrá sustituir a quienes se hallen 
ejercicio de ellos, ni acortar o ampliar su mandato.”
30  
A similar understanding of constitutional conventions is to be found in the 
Constitution of the Marshall Islands, which states that a Constitutional 
Conventions “shall be organized and shall proceed according to its own internal 
rules”, and adds: “It shall be beyond the authority of a Constitutional Convention 
to consider or adopt amendments that are unrelated to or inconsistent with the 
proposals presented to it by the [legislature] or by referendum.”
31 The last 
example is the constitution of the Philippines, which, again, is silent as to the 
legal status of the Convention.
32  
In concluding this survey it may be summarized that in practice as well as in 
theory constitutional conventions are a major American contribution to 
constitutional law, which never took root in European constitutional law. Outside 
of Europe, they are, however, widely known in the Americas and in t he 
American influenced Pacific area where they continue to constitute an 
established institution. In its most classic form, as supported in constitutional 
theory, a constitutional convention is an elected body acting under the 
commission of and beside an existing legislative body for the sole and express 
purpose of drafting or revising a constitution afterwards to be presented to the 
people for their approval or rejection. 
 
2. The European Convention in the Context of Comparative Constitutional Law  
In view of these results, the question remains why the Laeken Declaration took 
up the name “convention”, so uncommon in European constitutional law? A 
deliberate link with the Philadelphia Convention seems as unwise as 
improbable, and the remarks Valérie Giscard d’Estaing made in his “Henry 
                                                 
30   Constitution of Paraguay of 1992 (tit. IV, art. 289, 291). Cf. Constitution of Uruguay of 
1967 as amended to 1996 (sec. XIX, ch. III, art. 331). 
31   Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands of 1979 (art. XII, sec. 4). 
32   Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1986 (art. XVII).   12   
Kissinger Lecture” at the Library of Congress on February 11, 2003, tend to 
indicate that he preferred not to bring the two conventions into too narrow a 
relationship.
33 As there is no indication of the impact of any other model 
described, the only remaining reference that comes to mind is that to the 
convention which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.  
Before agreeing on this model, we should remember the history of that 
particular convention. When the European Council decided to establish it at the 
conferences in Cologne (3-4 June 1999) and Tampere (15-16 October 1999), it 
obviously did not know how to name it, which comes as no surprise in view of 
the fact that constitutional conventions are unknown in European constitutional 
history and law. In the English version it was said that “a draft of such a Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union should be elaborated by a body 
composed of representatives of the Heads of State and Government and of the 
President of the Commission as well as of members of the European 
Parliament and national parliaments”.
34  The French version took recourse to 
the word “enceinte”. In Spanish and Italian it read “órgano”, quite similar to the 
Swedish “organ”, whereas the Danish preferred “udvalg”. The Portuguese 
translation speaks of “instância”, while in German it says “Gremium”. The Dutch 
translation could not even settle on a single term and alternately used 
“vergadering” and “forum”. This linguistic overview may be sufficient proof that 
the word “convention” appears not to have been available. 
With regard to this Babel of languages, it is hardly surprising that on the first 
working meeting of the “Body” on 1 February 2000, item two on the agenda 
read: “Name of the Body”.
35 The subsequent record of the meeting laconically 
states: “The question of the name of the body (item 2 on the agenda) was 
settled, with the approval by a large majority of the term "Convention".”
36 It was 
                                                 
33   Cf. the few remarks on the Philadelphia Convention by Valérie Giscard d’Estaing in his 
“Henry Kissinger Lecture” at the Library of C ongress, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2003, 
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/7072.pdf (13 February 2003). 
34   http://ue.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang=en (9 March 2003) (own emphasis, HD). The 
website also leads to the different languages subsequently referred to. 
35   http://ue.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang=en (9 March 2003). 
36   http://ue.eu.int/dfdocs/EN/04134/En.pdf (12 March 2003)   13   
the Convention itself which thus assumed this name, and when it published its 
final draft, it presented itself as “[t]he body, known as ‘the Convention’ […].”
37 
The European Parliament eagerly took up the new designation,
38 and 
vehemently called for a European convention to suggest further constitutional 
changes. In its resolution on the Treaty of Nice and the future of the European 
Union, it “recommend[ed] the establishment of a Convention (to start work at 
the beginning of 2002), with a similar remit and configuration to the Convention 
which drew up the Charter of Fundamental Rights, comprising members of the 
national parliaments, the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
governments, the task of which would be to submit to the IGC a constitutional 
proposal based on the outcome of an extensive public debate and intended to 
serve as a basis for the IGC's work”.
39 It was, therefore, left to Pat Cox, 
President of the European Parliament, on the occasion of the solemn opening 
of the Convention on the Future of Europe (28 February 2002) to welcome the 
European Convention “to the place where the idea of this Convention was 
born”.
40 
It was the Herzog commission's usurpation of the popular term “convention” for 
itself, despite the lack of an authoritative definition in European constitutional 
law, which helped to establish it in European politics, although neither the 
makeup of the Herzog commission nor the provisions for submitting and 
adopting or rejecting its draft corresponded to the prevailing understanding of a 
                                                 
37   Council of the EU (ed.),  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Explanations relating to the complete text of the Charter. December 2000, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001, 5. 
38   Cf. the speeches by Nicole Fontaine President of the European Parliament at the 
Special Meeting of the European Council in Feira on 19 June 2000 
(http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/fei-pres_en.htm; 9 March 2003) and at the opening of the 
European Council in Biarritz on 13 October 2000. ( http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/biar-
pres_en.htm; 9 March 2003). 
39http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/pv2?PRG=DOCPV&APP=PV2&LANGUE=EN&S
DOCTA=4&TXTLST=1&POS=1&Type_Doc=RESOL&TPV=PROV&DATE=310501&PrgPrev=T
YPEF@A5|PRG@QUERY|APP@PV2|FILE@BIBLIO01|NUMERO@168|YEAR@01|PLAGE@1
&TYPEF=A5&NUMB=1&DATEF=010531 (9 March 2003). Already before the European Council 
meeting at Nice, the European Parliamanet as also the German government had suggested that 
the convention model might be applicable for the reforms of the Union to be achieve until 2004, 
cf. Gunter Pleuger, “Die institutionelle Reform der Europäischen Union: Perspektiven auf dem 
Weg nach Nizza”, in: Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (ed.),  Die 
Reform der europäischen Institutionen, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002, 127, 130. 
40   http://www.europarl.eu.int/president/speeches/en/sp0004.htm (9 March 2003).  Cf. 
Cécile Barbier,  La Convention européenne. Genèse et premiers résultats  (Courrier 
hebdomadaire, n° 1776-1777), Brussels : Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques, 
2002, 11-13 ; Daniel Göler, Die neue europäische Verfassungsdebatte. Entwicklungsstand und 
Optionen für den Konvent, Bonn : Europa Union Verlag, 2002, 71-77.   14   
constitutional convention. Viewed in this light, the Laeken Declaration can 
hardly  lay claim to having expressed a breathtaking vision of a new Europe 
sanctioned by instituting what in other contexts might be considered as a 
“democratic remedy for a democratic society”. Driven instead, especially after 
the failures at Nice, by the attempt to acknowledge what appeared to be 
inevitable, it adopted the request for an institution outside the Intergovernmental 
Conferences, which,  faut de mieux, it called convention, thus taking up a 
household name without meaning and substance in European constitutional law 
and already disfigured by the Convention on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. For the European Heads of State and Government, however, the name 
could be considered as an ideal precondition for meeting public demands, while 
at the same time reducing the risk of undermining the position of the 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
The Laeken Declaration carried the deformation of the convention from the 
perspective of established constitutional theory even further than the 
commission for the preceding convention had dared to. European political 
realities forbade any reference to the resolution of the Annapolis Convention of 
1786, which provided a phrasing so appropriate to the situation that only minor 
changes would have been needed to use it for calling the European Convention 
“to take into Consideration the situation of the [European Union], to devise such 
further Provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the [European 
Treaties] adequate to the exigencies of the Union”. The similarity of purpose 
might then have led to stipulate that members for the Convention should be 
elected in the same way and places as the members of the European 
Parliament are elected, “to consider the key issues arising for the Union’s future 
development”,
41 and, finally, to place its results before the public.
42 
All this might have happened and thus have helped to establish a convention as 
known in law. Instead, a “European Convention” was called into being, the legal 
precedents for which were substituted by a political decision animated by the 
attempt to usurp an institution in constitutional law and to transform it beyond 
                                                 
41   So in Laeken Declaration. 
42   As a typical example of an American state convention, cf. Constitution of Illinois of 1848, 
art. XII, sec. 1, in: The Federal and State Constitutions, ed. by Thorpe, II, 1006.   15   
recognition. This deformation affected all three aspects of a convention: the 
setting up, the commission, and the submission of its results.  
As far as the setting up of the Convention is concerned, the European 
Convention,
43 according to the Laeken Declaration, was not instituted as an 
elected body; instead it exclusively comprised members delegated by the 
European Heads of State or Government (28), the European Commission (2), 
the national parliaments (56), and the European Parliament (16).
44 None of 
these members had any popular mandate for what he or she was doing in the 
European Convention, nor was any form  of accountability provided for. 
Moreover, in contrast to any constitutional convention, including the Convention 
on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention had no 
right to “choose its own officers”.
45 The European Council appointed its 
chairman and the two vice-chairmen, thus deliberately weakening the 
Convention and causing more than just initial friction and irritation. These 
chairpersons, together with nine additional members, constituted the 
Praesidium, an institution as unknown to the Convention on the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as to any other constitutional convention. This Praesidium, 
with a two-thirds majority of its members delegated by the national governments 
and the European Commission and on eight of which the Convention had no 
influence whatsoever,
46 were responsible for giving direction to the deliberations 
of the Convention while at the same time embodying the influence of the 
European Heads of State and Government on its debates and their final results.  
In commissioning the Convention, the Laeken Declaration had already taken 
measures to ensure the desired results.  Other than the European Council in 
Cologne, it had strictly terminated the duration of the Convention,
47 whereas 
normally a constitutional convention terminates its proceedings when the draft is 
                                                 
43   For a matter of fact presentation, cf. Barbier,  Convention européenne, 18-26; Göler, 
Neue europäische Verfassungsdebatte, 77-95. 
44   The Australian Constitutional Convention of 1998 comprised both, elected and 
appointed members, in equal numbers. 
45   Constitution of the State of New York of 1894, art. XIV, § 2, in: The Federal and State 
Constitutions, ed. by Thorpe, V, 2736. 
46   For critical remarks on this point, cf. Jürgen Meyer, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 May 
2003, 7. Cf. also Göler, Neue europäische Verfassungsdebatte, 75-77. 
47   http://ue.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang=en (9 March 2003),  http://european-
convention.eu.int/enjeux.asp? lang=EN (15 January 2003).   16   
written.
48 To be sure, the Convention had the right to adopt its rules of 
procedure, but the Laeken Declaration had insisted on several strict orders with 
which it had to comply. They had been disguised as “working methods”, but 
what the Tampere European Council had understood under this heading really 
had been working methods. Now it clearly established that the “Council will be 
kept informed”. The Convention Chairman was instructed regularly to “give an 
oral progress report” at the Council meetings for the sole purpose of “enabling 
Heads of State or Government to give their views at the same time”.
49 This 
institutionalized outside influence and pressure left an unmistakable imprint on 
the “convention spirit”, which Giscard d’Estaing had envisioned as creating a 
“melting-pot” of ideas “in which, month by month, a common approach is 
worked out”.
50 
 As far as the submission of the results of the European Convention is 
concerned, the Laeken Council not only had deliberately refrained from 
mandating the Convention to present a final document. Instead it had limited its 
task to “try[ing] to identify the various possible responses”, thus removing from it 
the competence to write the final draft, a right even the Convention on the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights still had had.
51 No constitutional convention is 
known in law with a comparably restricted mandate. This applies also to the 
“Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” submitted by the President 
of the Convention to the European Council when meeting in Thessaloniki on 20 
June 2003.
52 In established constitutional law it says: “[T]he Constitution that 
may be agreed upon by such Convention shall be submitted to the people for 
their ratification or rejection.”
53 What was so self-evident to the people of 
                                                 
48   Cf., however, the Uruguayan Constitution, which limits a Constitutional Convention to 
one year: Constitution of Uruguay of 1967 as amended to 1996, sec. XIX, ch. III, art. 331. 
49   http://european-convention.eu.int/enjeux.asp?lang=EN (15 January 2003). 
50   Introductory speech by the President V. Giscard d’Estaing to the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, Document SN 1565/02 (p. 13). 
51   “This body should present a draft document in advance of the European Council in 
December 2000. The European Council will propose to the European Parliament and the 
Commission that, together with the Council, they should solemnly proclaim on the basis of the 
draft document a European Charter of Fundamental Rights” (Conclusions of the European 
Council in Cologne, http://ue.eu.int/df/default.asp?lang=en [9 March 2003]). 
52   CONV 820/03. 
53   Constitution of California of 1879, art. XVIII, sec. 2, in:  The Federal and State 
Constitutions, ed. by Thorpe, I, 446. For the same stipulation i n today’s phrasing, cf. 
Constitution of Idaho of 2002, art. XX, sec. 4, in: Constitutions of the United States: National 
and State, publ. for the Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, ed. by 
Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., Binder 2, Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 2002, ID 50. Cf. also   17   
California in the nineteenth century as it is today to those of Idaho, the Laeken 
Declaration viewed completely differently. The legal substance of the 
Convention’s final document, if it was to be achieved at all, was  from the 
beginning deliberately minimized. The Laeken Council had made it clear that it 
would view such a document only as a set of “recommendations”. The same 
Heads of State or Government which had so emphatically called for a “debate 
to be broadly based and involve all citizens”,
54 insisted on the completely non-
binding character of the final document as produced by the European 
Convention, leaving the Council supreme: “Together with the outcome of 
national debates on the future of the Union, the final document will provide a 
starting point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference, which will 
take the ultimate decisions.”
55 Neither in constitutional theory nor in existing 
constitutional law is a comparable procedure known. 
Even more than in regard to form or structure, the European Convention failed 
to meet the idea of a convention as established in constitutional law in terms of 
substance. It was no institution of the people. It was called for by the European 
Heads of State and Government, during its existence it was at their mercy, and 
it is they who will decide on its results. If we choose to call such a body 
“convention”, we may do so. In this case, however, we should not only be aware 
that any such body is a far cry from what is commonly understood by 
“convention” in constitutional law, but also that it was its particular set up which 
largely predisposed its results. 
  1. As it was the Heads of State and Government who exerted their influence on 
the deliberations via the Praesidium, it was obvious that national interests would 
prevail over a European perspective. The structure easily prevented the 
integrationists from gaining momentum. 
2.  The prevailing national interest assured that the principle of unanimity would 
not be abandoned. In the final result, as exemplified by the constitution treaty to 
be adopted,  the procedure requires every member state to agree instead of 
allowing for more flexible forms open to the pursuance of bolder solutions. 
                                                                                                                                               
the Constitution of the State of New York of 1894, art. XIV, § 2, in: The Federal and State 
Constitutions, ed. by Thorpe, V, 2736. 
54   http://european-convention.eu.int/enjeux.asp?lang=EN (15 January 2003). 
55   http://european-convention.eu.int/enjeux.asp?lang=EN (15 January 2003).   18   
3.  The enduring national interest manifested itself in the European Convention 
as the equivalent of the big states' dominance. It is symptomatic for the results 
of the Convention that, due to its structure and predisposition, it failed to 
achieve that “great compromise” between big and small states which 
constituted the resounding success of the Philadelphia convention. 
4.  The decision of the Intergovernmental Conference to set up a Convention in 
full transparency with its debates open to the public, but at the same time 
making sure that the people will have no direct voice in it, contributed to a 
situation in which the Convention and its results are interpreted quite differently 
in the individual countries, which will allow the national governments to 
influence the national debate to a large extent. 
In conclusion, judged by its setting up, commission, and submission procedure, 
the European Convention of 2002-03 was clearly out of step with what is 
generally understood by a constitutional convention in constitutional law, in 
constitutional theory, and in constitutional  history. This raises the question 
whether the example of the European Convention may help to establish in 
Europe a new and formerly unknown type of constitutional convention, thus 
allowing for advancing constitutional theory. Any affirmative response to this 
question will have to argue that the European Convention worked on principles 
which bear a significance beyond the individual case. Nothing in the Laeken 
Declaration or in the work of the Convention is apt to support such a 
suggestion. On the contrary, both failed to confer any special legitimization to 
the Convention, which was exclusively established to produce those results the 
IGC had failed to deliver. In order to assure that these results would prove to be 
acceptable for the European Heads of State and Government, they tailored the 
Convention to meet their specific goals, thus denying it the possibility of 
developing a legitimacy of its own. The Convention on the Future of the 
European Union, politically important as it undoubtedly was, has been little 
more than a makeshift body created to produce the results for which it was 
established. It was neither created as a visionary institution to introduce a 
constitutional convention in its own right into European constitutional law with all 
the implications which this might have had, nor did the Convention ever aspire 
to assume such an elevated role. Realpolitik was the order of the day, but this is 
a term in politics and not in law.   19   
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